Innovating between and within Technological Paradigms: A Response to Samuelson by Lee, Peter
University of Minnesota Law School 
Scholarship Repository 
Minnesota Law Review: Headnotes 
2009 
Innovating between and within Technological Paradigms: A 
Response to Samuelson 
Peter Lee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/headnotes 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lee, Peter, "Innovating between and within Technological Paradigms: A Response to Samuelson" (2009). 
Minnesota Law Review: Headnotes. 3. 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/headnotes/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review: Headnotes collection by an authorized administrator of the 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
 1 
Response 
Innovating Between and Within 
Technological Paradigms: A Response to 
Samuelson 
Peter Lee† 
Patents on interfaces are problematic—sometimes. In Are 
Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, Professor Pa-
mela Samuelson lays a valuable foundation for distinguishing 
when they are and when they are not.1 She begins by reviewing 
the economic benefits of interoperability as well as the histori-
cal emergence of interface patents, which threaten to impede 
such interoperability.2 After surveying an impressive array of 
potential policy responses,3 she concludes that patentees gen-
erally face adequate incentives to allow access to proprietary 
interfaces.4 Therefore, she ultimately argues in favor of meas-
ured, targeted policy interventions to remediate the (rare) in-
stances when interface patents actually impede interoperabili-
ty.5 In this Response, I extend Professor Samuelson’s analyses 
to further explore the antecedent question of identifying when 
intervention is warranted. As we will see, moreover, determin-
ing when such patents warrant attention informs the question 
of what kinds of intervention are most appropriate. 
In elaborating my Response, I rely heavily on the concept 
of technological paradigms. I adapt this term from philosopher 
of science Thomas Kuhn, who characterized “scientific para-
digms” as coherent traditions of scientific practice rooted in un-
 
†  Acting Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. I would like to 
thank Julie Cohen, Pamela Samuelson, and the editors of the Minnesota Law 
Review. Copyright © 2009 by Peter Lee. 
 1. Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperabili-
ty?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1943 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 1946–65. 
 3. Id. at 1969–2004. 
 4. Id. at 2004–05. 
 5. Id. at 2009. 
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ifying theory.6 By analogy to the technological sphere, I suggest 
that interfaces define technological paradigms: integrated sys-
tems of interoperability.7 Examples of technological paradigms 
include VHS, Betamax, and DVD, all of which define systems of 
interoperable components that are not interoperable with each 
other. Kuhn used the concept of paradigms to differentiate be-
tween two different types of scientific progress. Incremental 
progress proceeds as so-called normal science that refines and 
elaborates an established paradigm.8 However, truly “revolu-
tionary” progress occurs via paradigm shifts—disjunctive leaps 
from one paradigm to another.9 As we will see, interface pa-
tents (and their modification) can promote both kinds of 
progress in the technological sphere.10 
This Response highlights the importance of context in de-
termining the social benefits and costs of interface patents. 
Compared to Professor Samuelson, I take a more salutary view 
of such patents—and non-interoperability in general—in driv-
ing certain kinds of technological progress. I argue that exclu-
sive rights can provide incentives to invent valuable interfaces 
and encourage healthy competition between emerging techno-
logical paradigms. However, once an industry has coalesced 
around a single paradigm, the costs of strictly asserting inter-
face patents likely outweigh their benefits. By considering in-
dustrial and informational developments over time, policymak-
 
 6. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 
(2d ed. 1970) (discussing scientific paradigms and “paradigm shifts”). For ex-
ample, Aristotelian and Newtonian mechanics both represent coherent scien-
tific paradigms, even though they are incommensurable with each other. See 
id. at 10. 
 7. While I use the term “technological paradigm” in a rather broad sense, 
other authors have used it more narrowly. See, e.g., Clayton M. Christensen & 
Richard S. Rosenbloom, Explaining the Attacker’s Advantage: Technological 
Paradigms, Organizational Dynamics, and the Value Network, 24 RES. POL’Y 
233, 235 (1995) (characterizing technological paradigms as core technologies 
that define an overarching architecture); Giovanni Dosi, Technological Para-
digms and Technological Trajectories: A Suggested Interpretation of the De-
terminants and Directions of Technical Change, 11 RES. POL’Y 147, 148 (1982) 
(likening technological paradigms to worldviews that define research pro-
grams and modes of conceptualizing technical problems). In drawing this 
analogy between science and technology, I acknowledge its inherent limita-
tions. See id. at 158 (“[T]he analogy between science and technology is, in some 
respects, ‘impressionistic’ and the parallel should not be pushed too far with-
out reaching decreasing returns.”). 
 8. KUHN, supra note 6, at 23–42. 
 9. Id. at 66–91. 
 10. See Dosi, supra note 7, at 158 (emphasizing the roles of continuity and 
discontinuity in technological change). 
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ers can calibrate policy interventions to maximize innovation 
both between and within technological paradigms.11 Because 
context-specific information is critical to such measures, I ar-
gue that ex post mechanisms such as remedies analysis, patent 
misuse, and regulatory action by antitrust authorities consti-
tute the most effective policy interventions for addressing prob-
lematic interface patents. 
This Response proceeds in three Parts. Part I examines the 
underappreciated benefits of interface patents and non-
interoperability in promoting innovation between technological 
paradigms. The value of interface patents is highly contextual, 
however, and Part II argues that weakening certain interface 
patents—such as those covering industry standards—may be 
warranted to promote innovation within an established para-
digm. Part III builds on these observations to argue against 
broad, ex ante regulatory measures in favor of targeted, ex post 
policy interventions that can exploit industrial and informa-
tional developments over time. 
I.  INNOVATING BETWEEN TECHNOLOGICAL 
PARADIGMS: TECHNOLOGICAL MULTIPLICITY, 
COMPETITION, AND DISPLACEMENT   
The title of Professor Samuelson’s article is a fitting place 
to initiate a policy discussion. After all, before legislatures, reg-
ulatory agencies, courts, and industry actors consider modify-
ing interface patents, they should be sure that a problem exists. 
Unfortunately, the extent to which interface patents impede in-
teroperability is an exceedingly difficult question to answer. At 
a theoretical level, Professor Samuelson is certainly correct 
that firms have strong incentives to allow wide access to pa-
tented interfaces.12 Based on a dearth of litigated cases, as well 
as anecdotal accounts, Professor Samuelson reasonably con-
cludes that interface patents do not produce significant block-
age.13 As she acknowledges, however, there may be more inhi-
bition than meets the eye; it is very difficult to enumerate 
development opportunities foregone because of interface pa-
 
 11. Cf. Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Proper-
ty Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 546 (2003) (advocating proprietary devel-
opment to facilitate competition between rival platforms but open standards 
where a single platform has won out). 
 12. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 1951 (explaining the positive feedback 
loop and network effects arising from interoperability). 
 13. Id. at 2009. 
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tents.14 Professor Samuelson’s work thus invites further empir-
ical inquiries to quantify the extent to which patents actually 
impede interoperability.15 
Unfettered interoperability, however, is not always desira-
ble. At a theoretical level, there are situations where interface 
patents—and the non-interoperability they facilitate—are quite 
critical to driving technological progress. These circumstances, 
moreover, depend heavily on industry dynamics. As Professor 
Samuelson recognizes, interfaces are valuable and often costly 
to develop.16 Therefore, based on the underlying logic of the pa-
tent system, exclusive rights can provide valuable incentives to 
invent and develop new interfaces. More importantly, interface 
patents provide a mechanism by which firms can appropriate 
the value of broader technological paradigms.17 Thus, for ex-
ample, Microsoft’s patents on application program interfaces 
(APIs) help it appropriate the value of Windows, since other 
firms cannot interoperate with that system without utilizing 
those proprietary resources.18 Drawing from Joseph Schumpe-
ter’s classic theory,19 patents on interfaces may promote the 
emergence of new technological paradigms through a process of 
“creative destruction.”20 According to this view, revolutionary 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. In similar fashion, empirical work has valuably delineated the con-
tours of the “tragedy of the anticommons” in biomedical research. See Michael 
A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-
commons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Fiona Murray & 
Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of 
Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-commons Hypothesis, 63 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 648, 651 (2007) (finding modest anticommons effects 
in biomedical research); JOHN P. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANS-
FERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 2, 6 (2005), 
http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=776&cf=8 (finding little 
evidence of patent-related blockage).  
 16. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 1962. 
 17. See Weiser, supra note 11, at 579. 
 18. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists’ Illegal Conduct 
Under the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 888–89 (2000) (discussing Mi-
crosoft’s frequent updates to and additions of APIs); Samuelson, supra note 1, 
at 1948 (explaining APIs). As Professor Samuelson notes, there is a self-
disciplining relationship between exclusivity and value appropriation. Strict 
assertion of interface patents tends to decrease the value of a technological pa-
radigm, thus encouraging patentees to voluntarily permit some degree of inte-
roperability. Id. at 1951. 
 19. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 
81–86 (2d ed. 1947). 
 20. See Dosi, supra note 7, at 157–58; Weiser, supra note 11, at 576–79. 
However, some have questioned the continuing relevance of this classical 
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new entrants challenge and ultimately displace incumbent 
technological platforms. In this manner, interface patents—and 
the value appropriation they facilitate—can spur technological 
paradigm shifts.21  
Along these lines, exclusive rights may facilitate valuable 
competition among emerging, non-interoperable platforms. 
Take, for example, the recently concluded format war between 
Sony-backed Blu-ray and Toshiba-backed HD DVD. Notably, 
the technology underlying both of these formats—which is crit-
ical to achieving interoperability among their respective com-
ponents—is patented.22 Although the history of the format war 
is still being written, consensus exists that the more technolo-
gically robust format, Blu-ray, ultimately won out.23 Of course, 
one must balance these technological gains with the significant 
waste engendered by format wars; thousands of consumers who 
bought HD DVD players probably regret their purchases.24 
However, establishing a dominant paradigm always entails 
some waste, as a victorious technology renders rival technolo-
gies obsolete.25  
Even aside from facilitating the emergence of a single “vic-
torious” paradigm, interface patents can produce a stable equi-
 
narrative for software patents. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, 
Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 
(2001) (warning that innovation could suffer if software patents are not ade-
quately restricted in scope). 
 21. Cf. Christensen & Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 233–34 (suggesting 
that the introduction of radically different technologies can create new tech-
nological paradigms). Such competition may be particularly valuable if it pre-
vents an industry from coalescing around an inferior interface standard. Cf. 
Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 
336 (1985) (noting the widespread adoption of the QWERTY keyboard even 
though other formats, such as the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard, facilitate more 
rapid typing); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent 
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1215 n.152 (2000) (noting the risk that the 
“winning” standard will be “both inferior and durable”).  
 22. See Jeff Sauer, Nothin’ But Blu Skies, COMPUTER GRAPHICS WORLD, 
Apr. 1, 2008 (describing the patent positions of the Blu-ray and HD DVD sup-
porters). 
 23. This, too, is a contested notion. In many ways, Sony “bought” adoption 
of Blu-ray by offering significant concessions to major content providers and 
retailers. Additionally, Sony helped its cause by integrating Blu-ray technolo-
gy into its popular PlayStation gaming console. Nevertheless, Blu-ray has 
higher data capacity than HD DVD, thus promising better image quality and 
more robust user interactivity. Id. 
 24. See Samuelson, supra note 1, at 1951 n.31 (noting that the format war 
delayed the development of the high definition DVD market). 
 25. See Christensen & Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 234 (describing the 
emergence of new technologies as “competence-destroying” for older firms). 
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librium of multiple coexisting platforms. As Professor Samuel-
son recognizes, competition among proprietary systems, as well 
as among open systems, can enhance social welfare.26 And as 
Professor Christopher Yoo has described in the copyright con-
text, exclusive rights promote product differentiation that en-
hances both incentives to create and access to creations.27 
While certain caveats apply to the patent context,28 there is 
reason to believe that various “fiefdoms” of interoperability, 
while not interoperable with each other, may offer a wide menu 
of functionalities that appeal to different consumers.29 Thus, 
progress involves not only replacing an incumbent paradigm 
with a new one (for example, CDs triumphing over cassettes), 
but by the simultaneous existence of multiple technological pa-
radigms (for example, Microsoft Windows, Mac OS, and Li-
nux).30 Interface patents and non-interoperability may thus fa-
cilitate greater consumer choice.31  
II.  INNOVATING WITHIN TECHNOLOGICAL PARADIGMS: 
PROMOTING “NORMAL” PROGRESS BY BROADENING 
ACCESS TO AN INDUSTRY STANDARD   
While interface patents in “contested” industries may be 
salutary, they can be quite detrimental in other contexts. They 
may be particularly problematic when a patented interface be-
comes an industry standard.32 While Professor Samuelson re-
cognizes that patented standards are problematic, I wish to ac-
centuate their pernicious effects. When an industry has 
coalesced around a particular standard, the interfaces underly-
ing that standard approach the status of “infrastructure,” 
 
 26. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 1953. 
 27. Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 212, 276 (2004). 
 28. Id. at 225 n.41 (noting that patent law’s more expansive coverage of 
functionality calls into question the applicability of the differentiated products 
model to the technological sphere). 
 29. See id. at 255 n.136 (distinguishing product differentiation as competi-
tion “within” the market from Schumpeterian competition “for” the market, 
which is dominated by successive monopolists). 
 30. See Samuelson, supra note 1, at 1953 (“To compete effectively against 
Apple, RealNetworks has incentives to develop technology and music services 
that would be more attractive to consumers.”); cf. PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST 
METHOD 24–32 (3d ed. 1993) (highlighting the value of simultaneous, compet-
ing scientific theories). 
 31. See Weiser, supra note 11, at 586–87. 
 32. See Samuelson, supra note 1, at 1949–50 (distinguishing between in-
terfaces and standards). 
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which economic theory suggests should be widely accessible.33 
Qualcomm’s patents on video compression technology provide a 
particularly striking example. In late 2001, two standard-
setting organizations created the Joint Video Team (JVT), 
which aimed to develop a standard for video compression tech-
nology.34 Qualcomm participated in the JVT but did not dis-
close two critical patents that covered elements of the so-called 
H.264 standard, ultimately released in May 2003. Widespread 
adoption of this standard offered Qualcomm significant market 
power, and Qualcomm soon began exercising it. In 2005, Qual-
comm sued Broadcom for infringing its patents by practicing 
the H.264 standard. The district court held that Qualcomm’s 
patents were categorically unenforceable because of Qual-
comm’s failure to disclose them to the JVT.35 On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit narrowed the scope of this order, holding the 
patents unenforceable as to H.264-compliant products.36  
Although one could quibble over the appropriate scope of 
Qualcomm’s injunction, this is clearly a situation where inter-
face patents had potential to do much harm. Qualcomm’s pa-
tented interfaces were incorporated into an industry-wide 
standard, thus giving Qualcomm the right to exclude broad 
swaths of productive activity. In some sense, the Qualcomm 
case is an easy one for intervention because of the company’s 
bad-faith participation in the standard-setting process.37 Even 
 
 33. See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and 
Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 922–23 (2005) (arguing that “if 
a resource can be classified as infrastructure . . . there are strong economic ar-
guments that the resource should be managed in an openly accessible man-
ner”); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
257, 290–98 (2007) (observing that optimal patent protection is limited and 
generates significant positive externalities); Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intel-
lectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 85 (2008) (“[E]quating common-
place entities with nonprotectable ideas ensures that widely used infrastruc-
ture remains in the public domain.”). 
 34. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 35. Id. at 1009. 
 36. Id. at 1026. 
 37. These inquiries are, of course, highly fact-dependent. Rambus, which 
designs computer memory systems, has been accused of fraudulently partici-
pating in a standard-setting process that ultimately adopted its patented ran-
dom access memory technology as an industry standard. Rambus Inc. v. In-
fineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, the Federal 
Circuit rejected claims of fraud and questioned whether Rambus actually had 
a duty to disclose patents and patent applications. Id. In related litigation, the 
D.C. Circuit rejected the Federal Trade Commission’s allegations that Ram-
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outside of such malfeasance, however, the prospect of monopo-
lizing an industry standard renders certain patented interfaces 
particularly troubling.38 
This undue market leverage is present in other situations 
identified by Professor Samuelson as warranting some form of 
regulatory intervention.39 For example, citing “abuse of domi-
nant position,” the European Commission compelled Microsoft 
to disclose specifications to allow interoperability with Win-
dows-based technologies.40 In general, patents on standards 
represent a subset of patents on interfaces that commentators 
have found highly problematic.41 In all of these cases, when in-
terface patents cover a technological paradigm that has become 
an industry standard, the social costs of the right to exclude 
likely outweigh its benefits. Exacerbating this costliness is the 
ability of the patentee to appropriate value exogenous to it-
self;42 the value of a patented interface standard may reside 
less in its technical merit and more in the simple fact that 
 
bus’s conduct was unlawfully monopolistic. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 
466–67 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009). 
 38. For example, Forgent Networks aggressively asserted its patent on 
the technology underlying JPEG, a widely used standard for photographic 
compression. Forgent obtained over $100 million in royalties before a consor-
tium of information technology companies challenged the validity of the pa-
tent, leading to settlement. Michael Kanellos, Forgent Settles JPEG Patent 
Cases, CNET NEWS, Nov. 1, 2006, http://www.news.com/Forgent-settles-JPEG 
-patent-cases/2100-1014_3-6131574.html?tag=item. Forgent’s actions prompt-
ed the International Organization for Standardization to consider withdraw-
ing JPEG as a formal standard. See Priscilla Caplan, Patents and Open Stan-
dards, INFO. STANDARDS Q., Oct. 2003, at 2, 3 (discussing the JPEG dispute). 
 39. In arguing for enhanced access to proprietary technological para-
digms, it is important to distinguish between vertical access (by complementa-
ry products) and horizontal access (by “platform-level” competitors). See Weis-
er, supra note 11, at 560–61. Vertical access, such as allowing software 
applications to interoperate with Microsoft Windows, is generally desirable 
and may even redound to the benefit of the interface patentee (in this case, 
Microsoft). In extreme cases of abuse of a dominant position, however, even 
horizontal access by platform competitors may be warranted. See id. at 593 
(arguing that horizontal access should be allowed when a single standard is 
clearly dominating in order to facilitate competition within the platform). 
 40. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 1989–96. 
 41. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-
Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002); Janice M. Mueller, Patent 
Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
623 (2002); O’Rourke, supra note 21, at 1213; cf. Pamela Samuelson, Question-
ing Copyrights in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2007) (asserting that stan-
dards should not be protected by copyright). 
 42. See O’Rourke, supra note 21, at 1215–16 (noting that patents in net-
work markets may represent an exception to the rule that exclusive rights 
generally do not confer monopolies). 
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many parties have adopted it.43 Such patents may inhibit inno-
vation within a dominant paradigm, thus preventing the signif-
icant gains to be realized from elaborating and refining an ex-
isting platform.44 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT: INDUSTRIAL AND 
INFORMATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND EX POST 
POLICY INTERVENTIONS   
As Professor Samuelson recognizes, the virtues and vices of 
patents on interfaces, therefore, hinge considerably on con-
text.45 Interface patents in immature or contested industries 
may spur rival technological paradigms that produce either a 
victorious platform or the healthy coexistence of multiple plat-
forms. However, when an industry has coalesced around a sin-
gle interface standard, exclusive rights on that standard may 
be highly detrimental. These observations highlight the impor-
tance of information in determining appropriate responses to 
interface patents.46 Industrial characteristics only become ap-
parent with the passage of time and the emergence of ex post 
data. Thus, information is critical to Professor Samuelson’s ob-
servation that “if regulatory intervention of interface patents is 
appropriate at all, it should only be undertaken in a targeted 
manner to address specific harms.”47  
This emphasis on industrial developments and informa-
tion, moreover, lends itself to favor certain policy interventions 
over others. Ex ante interventions, such as removing interfaces 
from patentable subject matter, are likely to be blunt and over-
inclusive.48 Furthermore, they foreclose the ability of patent 
protection to drive early stage technological innovation and pa-
radigm definition. Rather, ex post interventions that can take 
 
 43. See Samuelson, supra note 1, at 1997; cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland 
Int’l, 49 F.3d 807, 819–20 (1st Cir. 1995) (“A new menu may be a creative 
work, but over time its importance may come to reside more in the investment 
that has been made by users in learning the menu and in building their own 
mini-programs—macros—in reliance upon the menu.”). 
 44. See Samuelson, supra note 1, at 2016. 
 45. Id. at 1945; Dosi, supra note 7, at 157–58. 
 46. See O’Rourke, supra note 21, at 1218. 
 47. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 1945. 
 48. However, other types of ex ante measures may be useful prophylac-
tics. For example, standard-setting organizations would be well served to 
clearly delineate requirements for disclosing and licensing intellectual proper-
ty prior to the creation of a standard. In this manner, they can leverage this 
preexisting “hook” if and when a firm asserts exclusive rights over such a 
standard. See Lemley, supra note 41, at 1957–68. 
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account of industry dynamics and context-specific information 
offer clear advantages. This argument thus favors ex post ap-
proaches such as remedies analysis, patent misuse, and regula-
tory action by antitrust authorities for addressing problems as-
sociated with interface patents.49 
Ultimately, these observations shed new light on an appar-
ent tension within patent law. Many commentators note that 
patents represent an intrinsic trade-off between maintaining 
incentives to invent and constraining access to new inven-
tions.50 While at first glance this trade-off appears limiting, po-
licymakers should recognize that patent protection represents a 
policy lever that can toggle between two types of technological 
progress. Patents on interfaces can encourage firms to develop 
new interfaces (and entirely new platforms), thus ushering in 
technological paradigm shifts. However, when a patented inter-
face becomes an industry-wide standard, relaxing exclusive 
rights may be warranted to promote “normal” progress within 
the paradigm. By recognizing the multifaceted functions that 
patents play51—and the environments in which they are most 
appropriate—policymakers can best harness the power of ex-
clusive rights to promote multiple kinds of innovation. 
 
 
 49. Information is not only necessary to determine when intervention is 
warranted, but also to fashion targeted, specific remedies. For example, grant-
ing ongoing royalties or issuing compulsory licenses for patented interfaces 
requires complex valuations of technology that are quite information-
intensive. Of course, such interventions demand a high degree of technical 
competence on the part of implementing institutions. However, past practice 
suggests that courts, antitrust authorities, and other regulatory bodies are ca-
pable of drawing meaningful distinctions and fashioning targeted remedies to 
address particular interface patents. 
 50. Telling in this regard, English patents originally arose as exceptions to 
legislation prohibiting deleterious monopolies. But see Yoo, supra note 27, at 
264–65 (arguing that a product differentiation model in copyright eliminates 
the supposed trade-off between access and incentives). 
 51. As Professor Samuelson notes, policymakers should also be aware of 
nonpatent issues that impede interoperability, such as efforts to maintain the 
secrecy of interface information. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 2011–12. This, 
too, militates against categorically weakening interface patents, which may 
shunt firms into protecting interfaces as trade secrets. 
